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Abstract
This paper provides a framework for studying competitive mixed bundling
with an arbitrary number of rms. We examine both a rms incentive to
introduce mixed bundling and equilibrium tari¤s when all rms adopt the
mixed-bundling strategy. We develop a method to derive the equilibrium
prices, and also o¤er a simple approximation of the equilibrium prices when
the number of rms is large. In the duopoly case, relative to separate sales,
mixed bundling has ambiguous impacts on prices, prot and consumer surplus.
While with many rms mixed bundling lowers all prices, harms rms and
benets consumers under a mild condition.
Keywords: bundling, multiproduct pricing, oligopoly
JEL classication: D43, L13, L15
1 Introduction
There are many circumstances where consumers are o¤ered a package of products
at a discounted price relative to the sum of the component prices. This selling
strategy is called mixed bundling. Examples include software suites, TV-internet-
phone bundles, insurance, banking services, theme park bundles, package tours,
value meals, and so on. (In the extreme form of pure bundling, all component
I am grateful to Mark Armstrong, Barry Nalebu¤, Andrew Rhodes, and Mike Riordan for their
helpful comments.
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products are sold in a package only and no individual products are available for
purchase.) Except for some obvious reasons such as the cost savings in produc-
tion and transactions, bundling can be a strategy to price discriminate and extract
more surplus from consumers (e.g. Stigler (1968), and Adams and Yellen (1976)),
or a strategy to deter the entry of potential competitors (e.g. Whinston (1990),
and Nalebu¤ (2004)). The impact of bundling on market performance is a classic
question which has received wide attention.
There is a substantial literature on bundling in the monopoly case,1 but in many
examples of bundling there are several competing multiproduct rms. This paper
studies mixed bundling as a price-discrimination strategy in a competitive envi-
ronment. The existing research on competitive mixed bundling such as Matutes
and Regibeau (1992), Anderson and Leruth (1993), Reisinger (2004), Thanassoulis
(2007), and Armstrong and Vickers (2010) focuses on the duopoly case. The usual
setup is a two-dimensional Hotelling model where consumers with di¤erent prefer-
ences for the products are distributed on a square.2 The literature often highlights
the case (e.g. when consumers are uniformly distributed and have unit demand for
each product) where mixed bundling intensies competition and benets consumers
relative to separate sales. More generally, however, mixed bundling in duopoly has
ambiguous impacts on price, prot and consumer surplus as we will emphasize in
this paper.3
This is the rst paper which studies competitive mixed bundling with an arbi-
trary number of rms.4 It makes three contributions. First, we propose a random-
utility framework for studying competitive mixed bundling. Compared to the spatial
1See, for example, Stigler (1968), Schmalensee (1984), and Fang and Norman (2006) for pure
bundling, and Adams and Yellen (1976), Long (1984), McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989),
and Chen and Riordan (2013) for mixed bundling.
2Armstrong and Vickers (2010) is the most general study so far. They consider a general
consumer distribution on the Hotelling square, and also allow for the existence of an exogenous
shopping cost and consider elastic demand and general nonlinear pricing schedules.
3There are also works on competitive pure bundling. See, for example, Matutes and Regibeau
(1988), Economides (1989), Kim and Choi (2015), Zhou (2017), and Hurkens, Jeon, and Menicucci
(2019). See Section 7 in Stole (2007) and Section 4 in Armstrong (2016) for surveys of the literature
on competitive bundling.
4In other aspects, however, we focus on the usual case where consumers have unit demand for
each product and do not face an exogenous shopping cost (though it is not hard to introduce).
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approach, this framework is more convenient to use when there are more than two
multiproduct rms. In the duopoly case, our model can be converted into a two-
dimensional Hotelling model such that we can compare our results with those in
the existing literature.5 Second, we explain why the problem of mixed bundling is
much harder once we go beyond duopoly, and we develop an approach to character-
ize the demand and the equilibrium prices when all rms adopt the mixed-bundling
strategy. When the number of rms is large, the equilibrium prices have a simple
approximation under a mild condition. Third, we argue that the impact of mixed
bundling on market performance can qualitatively defend on the number of rms in
the market.
Section 2 introduces the model and studies the benchmark case of separate sales.
Section 3 examines a rms individual incentive to adopt mixed bundling starting
from the separate-sales benchmark. The problem can be formulated as a monopoly
problem with a random outside option, and the particular structure of the outside
option in a symmetric competition environment enables us to obtain some clean
results. For instance, for a given valuation distribution (regardless of its correlation
structure), each rm has a unilateral incentive to introduce mixed bundling when
there are only two rms,6 or when there are many rms and a certain tail-behavior
condition is satised.
Sections 4 and 5 characterize the demand and the equilibrium pricing schedule
when all rms use the mixed-bundling strategy. The main challenge is how to
calculate a rms demand when there are more than two rms in the market. From
a particular rm a consumer can buy both products, one product only, or nothing.
In the third option, the consumer can buy both products from a single rival rm to
take advantage of its bundling discount, or mix and match across all rival rms to
assemble a better bundle. Which is better depends on whether the best matched
5Anderson and Leruth (1993) also use a random-utility framework in their duopoly model,
but they focus on the logit setting where the utility shock follows the extreme value distribution.
Another important di¤erence is that in our model the utility shock is at the level of individual
products, while in Anderson and Leruth (1993) the utility shock is at the bundle level (so that a
consumer might like both products individually but dislike the package of the two products). Zhou
(2017) uses a similar random-utility framework with an abtritary number of rms as in this paper
to study competitive pure bundling.
6A similar result is also derived by Armstrong and Vickers (2010) in their Hotelling setup.
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products among the rival rms are from the same rm or two di¤erent rms, and
also depends on the magnitude of the bundling discount. We nd a way to calculate
the demand and derive the necessary conditions for equilibrium prices.
However, due to the complexity of the demand system, further analytical progress
is made only in the duopoly case and the case with many rms. In the duopoly case,
relative to separate sales how bundling a¤ects prices is sensitive to the underlying
consumer valuation distribution. The existing literature highlights the example with
a uniform consumer distribution in the Hotelling square where bundling reduces all
prices. However, it is also easy to nd examples where bundling raises single-product
prices and lowers the bundle price, or where bundling raises all prices. In the case
with many rms, we o¤er a simple approximation of the equilibrium prices under a
mild condition. The approximated single-product price approaches (from below) the
price in the separate-sales benchmark, and the approximated bundling discount is
equal to half of the single-product markup in the separate-sales benchmark. There-
fore, all prices drop in the bundling regime relative to separate sales, and if the
production cost is zero the approximate pricing scheme features 50% o¤ for the
second product. We explain this di¤erence between the two cases by treating the
bundling discount as an exogenous shopping cost. It is shown that a small shopping
cost always induces rms to lower their prices, while a larger one has a less clear
impact.
Section 6 examines the welfare impacts of mixed bundling relative to separate
sales. With the assumption of full market coverage, bundling must harm total
welfare as it causes too much one-stop shopping and so sub-optimal match between
consumers and products. In the duopoly case, since bundling a¤ects prices in an
ambiguous way, its impacts on prot and consumer surplus are also ambiguous.
The existing literature emphasizes the case where mixed bundling harms rms and
benets consumers, but there are also cases where the opposite is true, or where
mixed bundling harms both rms and consumers. When the number of rms is
large, however, our approximation result implies that rms su¤er and consumers
benet from mixed bundling. Section 7 concludes. All omitted proofs are presented
in the appendix.
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2 The model and the benchmark
Consider a market where each consumer needs to buy two products 1 and 2. The
measure of consumers is normalized to one. There are n  2 rms, each supplying
both products. The unit production cost of each product is normalized to zero,
so we can regard prices as markups. Each product is horizontally di¤erentiated
across rms (e.g., each rm produces a di¤erent variety of the product), but there
is no product compatibility issue and consumers can freely mix and match. We
adopt a multiproduct version of the random utility framework in Perlo¤ and Salop
(1985) to model product di¤erentiation. Let Xkl  (X
k
1;l; X
k
2;l), k = 1;    ; n, denote
the random match utilities of rm ks two products for consumer l. We assume
that Xkl is i.i.d. across consumers (e.g. consumers have idiosyncratic tastes for the
products from di¤erent rms), and is also i.i.d. across rms (so rms are ex ante
symmetric). In the following we therefore suppress the subscript l and superscript
k whenever there is no confusion. Suppose X is distributed according to a common
joint cumulative distribution function (cdf) F (x1; x2). F has a full-dimensional
support S  R2 and a bounded, di¤erentiable, and everywhere strictly positive
probability density function (pdf) f(x1; x2). Let Fi(x) and fi(x), i = 1; 2, be the
marginal cdf and pdf of Xi, and let [xi; xi] be its support (where xi =  1 and
xi =1 are allowed). We sometimes consider the i.i.d. case where we further have
F (x1; x2) = F1(x1)F2(x2) and F1 = F2, i.e., the case when the two products in each
rm are symmetric and have independent match utilities.
We consider a discrete-choice framework where the incremental utility from hav-
ing more than one variety of a product is zero and so a consumer only wants to buy
one variety of each product.7 We also assume that a consumer has unit demand for
her preferred variety of each product. If a consumer consumes two products with
match utilities (x1; x2) (which can be purchased from di¤erent rms) and makes a
total payment T , she obtains surplus (x1 + x2)  T .
8
7This assumption is made in all the papers on competitive bundling, though it is not always
without loss of generality. For example, reading another article on the same subject in a di¤erent
newspaper, or reading another chapter on the same topic in a di¤erent textbook, sometimes im-
proves utility. There are works on consumer demand which extend the usual discrete choice model
by allowing consumers to consume multiple versions of a product (see, e.g., Gentzkow (2007)).
8Most of bundling papers assume such an additive utility function (which is compatible with
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If a rm sells its two products separately, it chooses a price vector (p^1; p^2). Let
P^  p^1 + p^2 be the associated bundle price. If a rm adopts the mixed-bundling
strategy, it chooses a pair of single-product prices (p1; p2) together with a bundling
discount . Let P  p1+ p2   be the associated bundle price. In either regime the
timing is that rms choose their prices simultaneously, and then consumers make
their choices after observing all the prices and match utilities. As often assumed in
the literature on competitive bundling, the market is fully covered (i.e., all consumers
buy both products). This will be the case if consumers do not have outside options,
or if on top of the above match utilities, consumers have a su¢ciently high basic
valuation for each product.
For convenience, we introduce a few pieces of notation. Denote by
Yi  maxfX
k
i g
n 1
k=1
the match utility of the best product i among n 1 rms. The joint cdf of (Y1; Y2) is
G(y1; y2)  F (y1; y2)
n 1, and let g(y1; y2) be the associated joint pdf. The marginal
cdf of Yi is Gi(y)  Fi(y)
n 1.
Let
Zi  Xi   Yi
be the valuation for a rms product i relative to the best product i among its
competitors. Its support is [xi xi; xi xi]. When rms sell their products separately
and charge the same prices, a consumer will buy that rms product i if and only if
Zi > 0. The joint cdf of (Z1; Z2) is
H(z1; z2) 
Z
S
F (y1 + z1; y2 + z2)dG(y1; y2) ;
and let h(z1; z2) be the associated joint pdf. (Whenever there is no confusion we
suppress the integral region S thereafter.) The marginal cdf of Zi is Hi(zi) R
Fi(y+ zi)dGi(y), and let hi(zi) be the associated marginal pdf. In particular, due
to rm symmetry, we have
Hi(0) = 1 
1
n
and hi(0) =
Z
fi(y)dFi(y)
n 1 : (1)
perfect complements under the assumption of full market coverage). There is research which studies
bundling of substitutes or complements (see, e.g., Long (1984), Armstrong (2013), and Haghpanah
and Hartline (2019)).
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Here Hi(0) is the chance that a rms product i is worse than the best product i
among its n 1 competitors, and hi(0) is the density of consumers who are indi¤erent
between this rms product i and the best product i among its competitors.
We rst report the equilibrium prices in the benchmark regime of separate sales.
Since rms compete on each product separately, the market for each product is
an independent Perlo¤-Salop model where only the marginal distribution of that
products match utility matters. Consider the market for product i, and let p^i be
the (symmetric) equilibrium price.9 Suppose a rm deviates to price p^0i, while other
rms stick to the equilibrium price p^i. Then the demand for the deviation rms
product i is
qi(p^
0
i) = Pr[Xi   p^
0
i > Yi   p^i] = 1 Hi(p^
0
i   p^i) :
In equilibrium the demand is qi(p^i) =
1
n
due to rm symmetry (which is also easy
to verify by using (1)).
The deviation rms prot from product i is p^0iqi(p^
0
i), and for p^i to be the equilib-
rium price the prot should be maximized at p^0i = p^i. From the rst-order condition
we derive
p^i =
1
nhi(0)
; (2)
where hi(0) is dened in (1). Henceforth, we assume that this rst-order condition
is also su¢cient for dening the equilibrium price. This is the case, for example,
when fi is log-concave (see Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991)).
10 In the example of uniform
distribution with Fi(x) = x, we have hi(0) = 1 and so p^i =
1
n
. In the example of
extreme value distribution with Fi(x) = e
 e x (which generates the logit model),
we have hi(0) =
n 1
n2
and so p^i =
n
n 1
. Generally, p^i decreases in n if fi is log-
concave (see, e.g., Anderson, de Palma, and Nesterov (1995), and Zhou (2017)), and
limn!1 p^i = 0 if and only if limx!xi
fi(x)
1 Fi(x)
=1 (see Zhou (2017)).
9In the duopoly case Perlo¤ and Salop (1985) have shown that the pricing game has no asym-
metric equilibrium. Beyond duopoly Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) show that there is no asymmetric
equilibrium in the logit model. More recently Quint (2014) proves a general result (see Lemma 1
there) which implies that our pricing game has no asymmetric equilibrium if fi is log-concave.
10Many often used distributions such as uniform, normal, logistic, and extreme value have a log-
concave density. Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) provide a weaker su¢cient condition which requires
fi to be  
1
n+1 -concave for a given n.
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3 Incentive to use mixed bundling
We rst examine, starting from separate sales, whether a rm has a unilateral in-
centive to introduce a small bundling discount (so that separate sales cannot be
an equilibrium outcome). We need another two pieces of notation: the cdf of Zi,
conditional Zj = zj where j 6= i, is
Hi(zijzj) 
Z zi
 1
hi(tijzj)dti ;
where hi(tijzj)  h(ti; zj)=hj(zj) is the conditional pdf of Zi.
Suppose a rm unilaterally deviates from separate sales and introduces a small
bundling discount  > 0 (but keeps its single-product prices the same as in the
separate-sales equilibrium). Figure 1 below depicts how this small deviation a¤ects
consumer demand in the space of (z1; z2), where 
i, i = 1; 2, indicates consumers
who buy only product i from the rm in question and 
b indicates consumers who
buy both products from it.
-
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Figure 1: The impact of a small bundling discount on demand
The negative e¤ect of the deviation is that the deviation rm earns  less from
the consumers who buy both products from it. In the regime of separate sales, the
measure of those consumers is

b = 1 H1(0) H2(0) +H(0; 0) =
2
n
  1 +H(0; 0) ;
8
where we have used Hi(0) = 1  
1
n
. So the (rst-order) loss from the deviation is

b.
The positive e¤ect of the deviation is that more consumers buy both products
from the deviation rm, i.e., the region 
b expands as indicated on the graph.
Those consumers on the two shaded rectangle areas switch from buying only one
product to buying both products from the deviation rm, and those on the small
shaded triangle area switch from buying nothing to buying both products from the
deviation rm.
Notice that the small triangle area is a second-order e¤ect when  is small (given
our distribution conditions), so only the two rectangle areas matter. The measure
of consumers on the vertical rectangle area is 
R1
0
h(0; z2)dz2, and the deviation
rm now makes an extra prot p^1    from each of them. Similarly, the measure
of consumers on the horizontal rectangle area is 
R1
0
h(z1; 0)dz1, and the deviation
rm now makes an extra prot p^2    from each of them. Thus, the (rst-order)
gain from the small deviation is
p^1
Z 1
0
h(0; z2)dz2 + p^2
Z 1
0
h(z1; 0)dz1 =

n
[2 H1(0j0) H2(0j0)] ; (3)
where the equality used
p^1
Z 1
0
h(0; z2)dz2 =
1
nh1(0)
 h1(0)
Z 1
0
h2(z2j0)dz2 =
1
n
[1 H2(0j0)] ;
and similarly
p^2
Z 1
0
h(z1; 0)dz1 =
1
n
[1 H1(0j0)] :
The small deviation is protable if the gain in (3) is greater than the loss 
b.
Therefore, we have the following result:
Proposition 1 Starting from separate sales with prices dened in (2), each rm
has a strict unilateral incentive to introduce mixed bundling if
n[1 H(0; 0)] > H1(0j0) +H2(0j0) : (4)
(i) For a given distribution F , (4) holds if n = 2, or if n is su¢ciently large and
limzi!xi xi
h(z1;z2)
h1(z1)h2(z2)
> 0.
(ii) For a given n, (4) holds if X1 and X2 are independent, negatively dependent
(in the sense that Pr(Xi > ajX i > b) is decreasing in b for any a), or limitedly
positively dependent (in the sense that Pr(Xi > ajX i > b)  Pr(Xi > a) for any a
and b, and d
dt
Hi(0jH
 1
j (t)) >  1 for t 2 [1 
1
n
; 1]).
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Proof. (i) When n = 2, we have Yi = Xi. Then conditional on Zi = 0 (i.e.,
X1i = X
2
i ), X
1
j and X
2
j should share the same conditional distribution. This implies
H1(0j0) = H2(0j0) = 1=2. Meanwhile, H(0; 0) is always strictly less than Hi(0) =
1=2. Then
2[1 H(0; 0)] > 2[1 Hi(0)] = 1 = H1(0j0) +H2(0j0) :
The proof for the large-n result is longer and is provided in the appendix.
(ii) When the two products have independent valuations, Hi(0j0) = Hi(0) and
H(0; 0) = H1(0)H2(0). Using Hi(0) = 1  
1
n
, one can verify that the gain is twice
the loss for any n. The proofs for the cases with dependent valuations are provided
in the appendix.
Given other rms are selling their products separately at the equilibrium prices
in the benchmark, a rms problem of whether to use mixed bundling is essentially a
monopoly problem where a consumers net valuation for its product i isXi (Yi p^i).
Here Yi p^i is regarded as a random outside option. Then our incentive results in part
(ii) are closely related to the existing works on the protability of mixed bundling
in a monopoly setting. See, for example, McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989),
and Chen and Riordan (2013). (In particular, Chen and Riordan (2013) derived
some similar conditions by using a copula approach. Our proof for the cases with
dependent valuations closely follows their approach.) However, in our symmetric
oligopoly setting Yi   p^i is related to Xi in a particular way such that given the
random outside option Yi p^i, the optimal monopoly separate-sales price for product
i is p^i. This additional structure leads to the result for n = 2 (which has also been
derived by Armstrong and Vickers (2010) in their Hotelling model), and the result
for a su¢ciently large n (which is new in the literature).
4 Demand with mixed bundling
Consider a symmetric mixed-bundling equilibrium (p1; p2; ), where pi is the single-
product price for product i and  is the bundling discount.11 Suppose that a rm
unilaterally deviates and o¤ers a pricing schedule (p01; p
0
2; 
0). Then for a consumer
11We restrict our attention to the case with  < minfp1; p2g. Otherwise, the bundle would be
cheaper than at least one individual product.
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who values this rms products at (x1; x2) and the best products from other rms
at (y1; y2), she has the following purchase options:
(a) buy both products from the deviation rm, in which case her surplus is
x1 + x2   (p
0
1 + p
0
2   
0);
(b) buy product 1 from the deviation rm but product 2 elsewhere, in which
case her surplus is x1 + y2   p
0
1   p2;
(c) buy product 2 from the deviation rm but product 1 elsewhere, in which case
her surplus is y1 + x2   p1   p
0
2;
(d) buy both products from other rms, in which case her surplus is    (p1 +
p2  ), where  is a random variable conditional on (y1; y2) as dened in (5) below.
When the consumer buys only one product, say, product i from some other rm,
she will buy the best one with match utility yi. When she buys both products from
other rms, the situation is more complicated if n  3. This is because now she may
buy them together from one rm or separately from two di¤erent rms. For this
reason, (y1; y2) is not a su¢cient statistic for the match utilities from other rms.
This is the main source of the complication in studying competitive bundling when
we go beyond the duopoly model. To understand , we need to discuss two cases:
First, if y1 and y2 are realized in the same rm, in option (d) the consumer will
buy both products from that rm, and so  = y1 + y2. Conditional on Y1 = y1 and
Y2 = y2, this event occurs with probability
(y1; y2) 
(n  1)f(y1; y2)F (y1; y2)
n 2
g(y1; y2)
;
where the numerator is the probability in the density sense that Y1 = y1 and Y2 = y2
are realized in the same rm among n 1 ones, and the denominator is the joint pdf
of (Y1; Y2), i.e. the probability that Y1 = y1 and Y2 = y2 in the density sense.
12 When
n = 2, this probability is 1. When the two products at each rm have independent
match utilities, this probability simplies to 1
n 1
as expected.
Second, with the rest of the probability 1 (y1; y2), y1 and y2 are realized at two
di¤erent rms. Then the consumer faces the trade-o¤ between consuming better-
matched products by two-stop shopping, in which case she gets surplus y1 + y2  
12More explicitly, we have
g(y1; y2) = (n  1)F (y1; y2)
n 3[f(y1; y2)F (y1; y2) + (n  2)
@F
@y1
@F
@y2
] :
11
(p1+p2), or enjoying the bundling discount by one-stop shopping, in which case she
gets surplus Y (y1; y2)   (p1 + p2   ), where Y (y1; y2) denotes the match utility of
the best bundle among n 1 rms conditional on Y1 = y1 and Y2 = y2 being realized
at di¤erent rms. (The cdf of Y (y1; y2) is characterized in Lemma 1 below.) Hence,
in this second case,  = maxfY (y1; y2); y1 + y2   g.
In sum, conditional on Y1 = y1 and Y2 = y2, we have
 =
8><
>:
y1 + y2 with probability (y1; y2)
maxfY (y1; y2); y1 + y2   g with probability 1  (y1; y2)
: (5)
The simplest case is when n = 2. Then y1 and y2 must be from the same
rm and so  = y1 + y2 for sure. The problem can then be converted into a two-
dimensional Hotelling model by using two location random variables Z1 = X1 Y1
and Z2 = X2   Y2. That is the model often used in the existing literature.
When n  3, the situation is more complicated. We need to deal with one more
random variable Y (y1; y2) which is correlated with Y1 and Y2. Its cdf is reported in
the following lemma (all omitted proofs can be found in the appendix):
Lemma 1 When n  3, the cdf of Y (y1; y2) (the match utility of the best bundle
among n   1 rms conditional on Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, and they being realized at
di¤erent rms), is
L(yjy1; y2) =
F1(y   y2jy2)
F1(y1jy2)
F2(y   y1jy1)
F2(y2jy1)
(6)

1
F (y1; y2)n 3
 
F (y1; y   y1) +
Z y2
y y1
Z y x2
x
1
f(x1; x2)dx1dx2
!n 3
for y 2 [maxfy1 + x2; x1 + y2g; y1 + y2), where Fi(yijyj) is the conditional cdf of yi.
With this result, we can calculate the expectation of any function (Y1; Y2;)
(if exists) as follows:
E[(Y1; Y2;)] =
Z
(y1;y2)
[(y1; y2) (y1; y2; y1 + y2) (7)
+(1  (y1; y2))
Z
y
(y1; y2;maxfy; y1 + y2   g)dL(yjy1; y2)]dG(y1; y2) :
Given (y1; y2; ), Figure 2 below describes how a consumer chooses among the
four purchase options in the space of (x1; x2). As before, 
i, i = 1; 2, indicates
12
the region where the consumer buys only product i from the deviation rm, and

b indicates the region where the consumer buys both products from it. Then
integrating the area of 
i over (y1; y2; ) by using (7) yields the demand for the
deviation rms single product i, and integrating the area of 
b over (y1; y2; ) yields
the demand for its bundle.
x1
x2
@
@
@
@@
y1 + p
0
1   p1   
0
   y2 + p
0
1   p1 + 
y2 + p
0
2   p2   
0
   y1 + p
0
2   p2 + 

b

2

1
buy both from
other rms
Figure 2: The pattern of consumer choice
From Figure 2, we can see that the equilibrium demand for a rms single product
1 is

1()  E[
Z y2 
x
2
Z x1
 y2+
f(x1; x2)dx1dx2] ; (8)
and the equilibrium demand for a rms single product 2 is

2()  E[
Z x2
 y1+
Z y1 
x
1
f(x1; x2)dx1dx2] : (9)
(The expectations are taken over (y1; y2; ).) Given full market coverage, the equilib-
rium demand depends only on the bundling discount  but not on the single-product
prices p1 and p2. Let 
b() be the equilibrium demand for a rms bundle. Then
we should have

i() + 
b() =
1
n
: (10)
This is because with full market coverage all consumers buy product i, so 1=n of
them should buy it from a particular rm (either via single product purchase or via
bundle purchase). This also implies that 
1() = 
2(), even when the two products
are asymmetric.
13
5 Equilibrium mixed-bundling prices
5.1 The general case
To characterize the equilibrium prices, it is useful to introduce a few more pieces of
notation:
1  E[
Z x2
 y1+
f(y1   ; x2)dx2] ; 1  E[
Z y1 
x
1
f(x1;    y1 + )dx1] ;
2  E[
Z x1
 y2+
f(x1; y2   )dx1] ; 2  E[
Z y2 
x
2
f(   y2 + ; x2)dx2] ;
  E[
Z  y2+
y1 
f(x1;    x1)dx1] : (11)
(The expectations are all taken over (y1; y2; ).) Notice that all i, i and  are
functions of  only. The economic meaning of these notations will be clear below.
In particular, i + j +  is the density of marginal consumers who stop buying
product i from a rm when it unilaterally increases its price pi, and 1 + 2 +  is
the density of marginal consumers who switch to buying both products from a rm
when it unilaterally increases its discount i.
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To derive the necessary conditions for (p1; p2; ) to be the equilibrium pricing
schedule, let us consider a few local deviations:
First, suppose a rm unilaterally raises its bundling discount to 0 = +" (where
" > 0 is small) while keeps its single-product prices unchanged. Then conditional
on (y1; y2; ), Figure 3a below describes how this small deviation a¤ects consumer
choices: 
b expands because now more consumers buy both products from the
deviation rm. The marginal consumers who change their purchase behavior are
distributed on the shaded areas.
13Note that  can depend on , so it is not true that 
0i() =  (j + j) except when n = 2.
This implies that beyond the duopoly case, the rst-order conditions for equilibrium prices which
we derive below cannot be written in terms of equilibrium demand functions and their derivatives.
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Figure 3a: Price deviation and consumer choice I
Here
~1 =
Z x2
 y1+
f(y1   ; x2)dx2 and ~2 =
Z x1
 y2+
f(x1; y2   )dx1
are the densities of marginal consumers along the line segments ~1 and ~2 on the
graph, respectively, and
~ =
Z  y2+
y1 
f(x1;    x1)dx1
is the density of marginal consumers along the diagonal line segment on the graph.
Integrating them over (y1; y2; ) yields the previously introduced notation: E[~i] =
i and E[~] = . For the marginal consumers on the vertical shaded area (which has
a measure of "~1), they switch from buying only product 2 to buying both products
from the deviation rm, and so the rm makes p1      " extra prot from each of
them. Similarly, the deviation rm makes p2      " extra prot from each of the
marginal consumers on the horizontal shaded area (which has a measure of "~2).
For those marginal consumers on the diagonal shaded area (which has a measure of
"~), they switch from buying both products from other rms to buying both from
the deviation rm. So the deviation rm makes p1 + p2      " extra prot from
each of them. The only negative e¤ect of the deviation is that those consumers
on 
b who were already purchasing both products at the deviation rm now pay "
less. The sum of all these e¤ects integrated over (y1; y2; ) should be equal to zero
in equilibrium. After all the second-order e¤ects being discarded, this yields the
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following rst-order condition:
1(p1   ) + 2(p2   ) + (p1 + p2   ) = 
b() ; (12)
where 
b() is dened in (10) and i and  are dened in (11).
Second, suppose a rm unilaterally raises its stand-along price p1 to p
0
1 = p1 + "
and its bundling discount to 0 =  + " (such that its bundle price remains un-
changed). Figure 3b below describes how this small deviation a¤ects consumer
choices: 
1 shrinks because now fewer consumers buy a single product 1 from the
deviation rm.
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Figure 3b: Price deviation and consumer choice II
Here
~2 =
Z y2 
x
2
f(   y2 + ; x2)dx2
is the density of marginal consumers along the line segment ~2 on the graph. In-
tegrating it over (y1; y2; ) yields the previously introduced notation: E[~2] = 2.
For those marginal consumers on the horizontal shaded area (which has a measure
of "~2), they switch from buying only product 1 to buying both products from the
deviation rm. So the rm makes p2    extra prot from each of them. For those
marginal consumers on the vertical shaded area (which has a measure of "~2), they
switch from buying product 1 to buying nothing from the deviation rm. So the
rm loses p1 from each of them. The direct revenue e¤ect of this deviation is that
the rm earns " more from each consumer on 
1. The sum of these e¤ects integrated
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over (y1; y2; ) should be equal to zero in equilibrium. This yields another rst-order
condition:
2(p2   ) + 
1() = 2p1 ; (13)
where 
1() is dened in (8) and 2 and 2 are dened in (11).
Third, suppose a rm slightly raises its stand-along price p2 to p
0
2 = p2+" and its
bundling discount to 0 =  + " (such that its bundle price remains unchanged). (If
the two products are symmetric, there is no need to consider this third deviation.)
Then 
2 shrinks as described in Figure 3c below.
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Figure 3c: Price deviation and consumer choice III
Here
~1 =
Z y1 
x
1
f(x1;    y1 + )dx1
is the density of marginal consumers along the line segment ~1 on the graph. Inte-
grating it over (y1; y2; ) yields the previously introduced notation: E[~1] = 1. A
similar argument as before yields the third rst-order condition:
1(p1   ) + 
2() = 1p2 ; (14)
where 
2() is dened in (9) and 1 and 1 are dened in (11).
The following result rewrites the above three rst-order conditions:
17
Proposition 2 If a symmetric (pure-strategy) mixed-bundling equilibrium exists,
the single-product prices p1 and p2 and the bundling discount  must satisfy
(1 + 2 + )p1 + p2 =
1
n
+ (1 + ) ; (15)
(2 + 1 + )p2 + p1 =
1
n
+ (2 + ) ; (16)
and
(2   1)p1 + (1   2)p2 = 2
1()  (1 + 2) : (17)
Notice that (15) is derived from (12) and (13) by using (10), and (16) is derived
from (12) and (14) by using (10). Adding (13) to (14) and using 
1() = 
2()
yield (17). The rst two conditions are linear in p1 and p2. From them one can solve
solve p1 and p2 as functions of . Substituting them into the third condition yields
an equation of . These equations are more complicated than they appear because
all i, i and  are functions of .
Discussion: equilibrium existence. To prove the existence of a symmetric (pure-
strategy) equilibrium,14 we need to show that (i) the system of necessary conditions
(15)-(17) has a solution, and (ii) the necessary conditions are also su¢cient for
dening the equilibrium prices. Unfortunately, both issues are hard to investigate.
For the rst one, we can prove it in the i.i.d. case when n = 2 or when n is su¢ciently
large under the log-concavity condition. For the second one, no analytical progress
has been made in general even in the duopoly case. This is an unsolved problem in
the literature on mixed bundling.
Discussion:  as an exogenous shopping cost. It is useful to consider an alterna-
tive situation where rms do not o¤er a bundling discount but instead consumers
face an exogenous shopping cost , i.e. if they buy the two products from two dif-
ferent rms, they need to pay an extra cost  (which reects, for instance, the extra
travelling cost or the transaction cost of paying an additional bill). Such a shopping
cost a¤ects consumer behavior exactly the same as the bundling discount. Using a
similar local-deviation argument as above, one can derive the rst-order conditions
for (p1; p2) to be the equilibrium prices:
(1 + 2 + )p1 + p2 =
1
n
; (18)
14The existence of a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium is guaranteed by Theorem 1 in Becker
and Damianov (2006) if we can impose a nite upper bound on prices.
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and
(2 + 1 + )p2 + p1 =
1
n
: (19)
This system is simpler and as we will see later, when the shopping cost is small,
the solution to this system has a simple approximation. This will be helpful later
on when we explain the intuition of the pricing result when the number of rms is
large.
5.2 The i.i.d. case
The system of (15)-(17) is hard to deal with analytically. To make progress, hence-
forth we focus on the i.i.d. case where the two products at each rm are symmetric
and have independent match utilities. Slightly abusing the notation, let F (x) and
f(x) be the common cdf and pdf of Xi, and let
H(z) =
Z
F (y + z)dF (y)n 1 and h(z) =
Z
f(y + z)dF (y)n 1
be the common cdf and pdf of Zi = Xi Yi. (When n = 2, h(z) is symmetric around
zero.) Let p be the common single-product price, and let  = i and  = i. Then
the equilibrium conditions in (15)-(17) simplify to
p =
1=n+ ( + )
 +  + 2
; (20)
and
(   ) p = 
1()   : (21)
The expressions for , , , and 
1() are still complicated in general. However,
they are simple in the duopoly case, and they also have simple approximations when
 is small (which can be shown to be true under a mild condition when the number
of rms is large). Hence, in the following we study two polar cases.
The duopoly case. In the duopoly case,  = y1 + y2 for sure, and so only the
two random variables Zi = Xi   Yi, i = 1; 2, matter for the demand analysis given
the assumption of full market coverage. Our random utility model can then be
converted into a two-dimensional Hotelling model.
Using the symmetry of h one can check that  =  = h()[1   H()] and

1() = [1 H()]
2. Thus, (21) simplies to
 =
1 H()
h()
: (22)
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If 1   H is log-concave (which is implied by the log-concavity of f), this equation
has a unique positive solution  > 0. Meanwhile, (20) simplies to
p =

2
+
1
4( + )
(23)
with  = 2
R 
0
h(t)2dt.
The following table reports the equilibrium prices for a few distributions:
p^ p  P
Uniform 0:5 0:57 1=3 0:81
Normal 1:77 1:85 1:06 2:63
Exponential 1 1:5 1 2
Table 1: Examples of price impact in duopoly
In both the uniform and the normal example, compared to the regime of separate
sales, each single product becomes more expensive but the bundle becomes cheaper.
(Note that in our uniform example Zi = Xi   Yi has a triangle distribution, so it is
di¤erent from the usual uniform example in the Hotelling model where consumers
are uniformly distributed on the square.) In the exponential example, the bundle
price remains unchanged, so that all prices weakly go up. Such an example has not
appeared in the literature.
More generally, in the duopoly case we have the following result:
Proposition 3 In the i.i.d. duopoly case, if 1 H(z) is log-concave (which is true if
f is log-concave), the system of (22) and (23) has a unique solution with  < p, and
the bundle price is no greater than in the regime of separate sales (i.e., 2p   2p^).
Proof. Notice that  < p if  +  < 1
2
. This is equivalent to
h()[1 H()] + 2
Z 
0
h(t)2dt <
1
2
h()
1 H()
by using (22) and the denitions of  and . This inequality holds at  = 0. At
the same time, it easy to check that both sides are increasing in  given 1 H() is
log-concave, and the derivative of the right-hand side is at least twice the derivative
of the left-hand side given 1 H() < 1
2
for  > 0.
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Notice that the bundle price is 2p    = 1
2(+)
, and the bundle price in the
regime of separate sales is 1=h(0). The former is weakly lower if  +   h(0)
2
, or
more explicitly if
h()[1 H()] + 2
Z 
0
h(t)2dt 
1
2
h(0) :
This is true as the equality holds at  = 0 and the left-hand side is increasing in 
if and only if 1 H() is log-concave.
From the proof, we can see that if 1   H() is log-convex, the bundle will be
actually more expensive than in the regime of separate sales. (Its price remains
unchanged in the edge case of the exponential distribution as we have seen.) For
instance, in the case of Pareto distribution with F (x) = 1   1
x2
where x 2 [1;1),
one can check p^ = 5
8
, p  1:48 and   1:37, so the bundle price increases from 1:25
in the regime of separate sales to about 1:58 in the regime of mixed bundling.
One example which is often highlighted in the literature based on the Hotelling
model is when H(z) is a uniform distribution (which is possible in our setup only
if we go beyond the i.i.d. case). In that case, all three prices go down compared to
separate sales. Therefore, these examples suggest that in the duopoly case the im-
pact of bundling on market prices is sensitive to the underlying consumer valuation
distribution. We will see a similar observation concerning the impacts of bundling
on prot and consumer welfare.
The case with many rms. We rst report a useful approximation result when
 is small:
Lemma 2 For a given n, if   0, we have
 
h(0)
n
 

h0(0)
n
+
h(0)2
n  1

 ;
 

1 
1
n

h(0) +

h0(0)
n
  h(0)2

 ; (24)
 
n
n  1
h(0)2 ;

1() 
1
n

1 
1
n

 
2
n
h(0) ;
where h(0) =
R
f(x)dF (x)n 1 and h0(0) =
R
f 0(x)dF (x)n 1.
Note that ++ = h(0), where h(0) is the equilibrium (single-product) demand
slope in the regime of separate sales. When n is large, under a mild condition we
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show in the appendix that the system of (20) and (21) has a solution with  close to
zero. Then the approximations in (24) can be used to solve the equilibrium prices.
Proposition 4 Suppose jf
0(x)j
f(x)
is uniformly bounded and limn!1 p^ = 0, where p^ is
the separate-sales price dened in (2). When n is large, the system of (20) and (21)
has a solution with  2 (0; p^) and it can be approximated as
p 
1
nh(0)
1 + h(0)
1 + n
n 1
h(0)
;  
1
2h0(0)
h(0)
+ 2n
2 3n+2
n2 n
nh(0)
:
Both the single-product price and the bundle price are lower than in the regime of
separate sales.
For a large n, we can further simplify the approximations to p  p^ and   1
2
p^.
That is, the single-product price is approximately equal to the price in the regime of
separate sales and the bundling discount is approximately half of the single-product
price. The mixed-bundling scheme in this limit case can thus be interpreted as
50% o¤ for the second product.15 This proposition also implies that when there
are many rms in the market, mixed bundling tends to be pro-competitive relative
to separate sales.
To understand the result that the single-product price drops, suppose now  is
an exogenous shopping cost. In the i.i.d. case, from (18) and (19) we know that the
equilibrium price satises ( +  + 2)p = 1
n
. When  is small, we have
p 
1=n
h(0) + 

1
nh(0)
1
1 + n
n 1
h(0)
< p^
by using the approximations in (24) and  +  +   h(0). That is, introducing
a small shopping cost in the regime of separate sales will induce rms to lower
their prices. This is because the shopping cost generates a new margin  (i.e.,
the diagonal boundary in the previous graphs) on which the consumers are doubly
protable. (The shopping cost also a¤ects the other margins  and , but it has
no rst-order e¤ect on  +  +  since it equals h(0) when  is small.) A similar
economic force works when  is a small endogenous bundling discount.
15When there is a positive production cost c for each product, we have   (p^   c)=2, i.e., the
bundling discount is approximately equal to half of the single products markup.
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This argument, however, can fail when  becomes larger.16 For example, when 
is su¢ciently large, the situation will be as if all rms use a pure-bundling strategy.
According to Zhou (2017), we know that pure bundling often induces higher market
prices than in separate sales when n is above a threshold. Hence, in general whether
 increases or decreases the single-product prices also depends on the magnitude of
. This discussion also points out an important di¤erence between mixed bundling
and pure bundling: with mixed bundling,  is endogenous and it becomes small
when there are many rms; while pure bundling is the same as having a xed and
su¢ciently large  regardless of the number of rms.
6 Impact of mixed bundling
Given the assumption of full market coverage, total welfare is determined only by
the match quality between consumers and products. Since the bundling discount
induces consumers to one-stop shop too often, mixed bundling must lower total
welfare relative to separate sales. In the following, we discuss its impacts on industry
prot and consumer surplus.
Let (p1; p2; ) denote the equilibrium industry prot. Then
(p1; p2; ) = p1 + p2   n
b() :
Every consumer buys both products, but those who buy both from the same rm
pay  less. Thus, relative to separate sales the impact of mixed bundling on industry
prot is
  (p1; p2; )  (p^1; p^2; 0) = (p1   p^1) + (p2   p^2)  n
b()
= P   P^ + n
1() ; (25)
where we used (10) in the second equality.
Let v(~p1; ~p2; ~) denote the consumer surplus when all rms are charging single-
product prices (~p1; ~p2) and o¤ering a bundling discount ~. Given full market cover-
age, an envelope argument implies that vi(~p1; ~p2; ~) =  1, i = 1; 2, and v3(~p1; ~p2; ~) =
n
b(~), where the subscripts indicate partial derivatives. (This is because raising ~pi
16When n = 2, it can be shown that p always decreases in the shopping cost  when 1   H is
log-concave.
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by " will make every consumer pay " more, and raising the discount ~ by " will save
" for every consumer who buy both products from the same rm.) Then relative to
separate sales, the impact of mixed bundling on consumer surplus is
v  v(p1; p2; )  v(p^1; p^2; 0)
=
Z p1
p^1
v1(~p1; p2; )d~p1 +
Z p2
p^2
v2(p^1; ~p2; )d~p2 +
Z 
0
v3(p^1; p^2; ~)d~
=  (p1   p^1)  (p2   p^2) + n
Z 
0

b(~)d~
= P^   P   n
Z 
0

1(~)d~ ; (26)
where we used (10) in the last equality. From (25) and (26), it is also clear that
mixed bundling always harms total welfare since 
1(~) decreases in ~.
To make more progress we again focus on the i.i.d. case. In the duopoly case,
we have seen that the impact of bundling on prices is ambiguous. This makes the
impacts on industry prot and consumer surplus ambiguous as well. The following
table reports a few examples by using the above formulas:
 v ( + v)
Uniform  0:16 0:10  0:06
Normal  1:10 0:93  0:17
Exponential 0:07  0:22  0:15
Table 2: Examples of welfare impact in duopoly
The exponential example di¤ers qualitatively from the uniform and the normal
example. Armstrong and Vickers (2010) derived a su¢cient condition for mixed
bundling to harm rms and benet consumers (see their Proposition 4). With our
notation, the condition is d
dz
H(z)
h(z)
 1
4
for z  0. The uniform example satises this
condition, but the normal and the exponential example do not. To show another
possibility where both rms and consumers su¤er from bundling, let us consider a
generalized Pareto distribution with f(x) = (1  ax)
1
a
 1 and F (x) = 1  (1  ax)
1
a ,
where a 2 [0; 1] and the support is [0; 1
a
]. The distribution becomes the exponential
distribution when a = 0 and the uniform distribution when a = 1. Figure 4 below
depicts how the impacts of mixed bundling in this example vary with a. When a
is su¢ciently large, mixed bundling harms rms and benets consumers; when a
24
is su¢ciently small, the opposite is true; in between mixed bundling harms both
rms and consumers. Therefore, in the duopoly case the welfare impact of mixed
bundling is ambiguous in general.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
a
profit
consumer surplus
Figure 4: Welfare impacts with a generalized Pareto distribution
The welfare impacts become less dependent on the underlying distributions when
n is large and the approximations in Proposition 4 apply. Since mixed bundling
reduces all prices in that case relative to separate sales, it must harm rms and
benet consumers (as consumers can at least buy the same products as in the case
of separate sales but at lower prices).
7 Conclusion
This paper has o¤ered a random-utility framework for studying competitive mixed
bundling in an oligopoly market. This approach is more convenient to use than the
usual spatial approach in the existing literature when we need to deal with more
than two rms. We have explained the source of di¢culty in studying competitive
mixed bundling beyond the duopoly case, and have developed a method to calculate
demand and characterize the equilibrium prices. Analytical progress on the impacts
of bundling on prices, prot and consumer welfare is only made in the duopoly
case (where we derive some new results) and the case with many rms (where an
approximation of the equilibrium prices is possible). We emphasize that the impact
of bundling in the duopoly case is sensitive to the underlying consumer valuation
distribution and so it is hard to draw general conclusions, while in the case with
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many rms bundling lowers market prices, harms rms and benets consumers under
a mild condition.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We prove the other su¢cient conditions for (4). We use
the copula approach introduced in Chen and Riordan (2013). (A classic reference
on copula is Nelson, 2006.) Let C(t1; t2) be the copula associated with the joint
cdf H such that H(z1; z2) = C(H1(z1); H2(z2)). According to the Sklars Theorem,
such a copula exists uniquely for a given joint cdf if its marginal distributions are
continuous. Therefore, a joint cdf can be represented by its marginal cdfs and a
copula. A copula itself is a joint cdf on [0; 1]2 with uniform marginal distributions,
and it captures the dependence structure of the original distribution. Let Ci(t1; t2)
be the partial derivative with respect to ti. Let d(t)  C(t; t) be the diagonal section
of C, and it is increasing and uniformly continuous on [0; 1]. The following properties
on copula are useful:
(a) C(t1; 0) = C(0; t2) = 0;
(b) C(t1; 1) = t1 and C(1; t2) = t2;
(c) Ci(t1; t2) is the conditional distribution of t i given ti;
(d) maxf0; 2t  1g  d(t)  t.
We rst claim that (4) is equivalent to
1  d(t) > (1  t)d0(t) at t = 1 
1
n
. (27)
The denition of copula and Hi(0) = 1 
1
n
imply that H(0; 0) = C(H1(0); H2(0)) =
d(t) at t = 1  1
n
. Using the fact
h(z1; z2) = C12(H1(z1); H2(z2))h1(z1)h2(z2) (28)
and property (a), one can check that H1(0j0) = C2(t; t) and H2(0j0) = C1(t; t) at
t = 1  1
n
. Then (4) can be written as n(1  d(t)) > C1(t; t) + C2(t; t) at t = 1 
1
n
which is equivalent to (27).
The large-n result. Let t = 1   " with "  0. Then Taylor expansion, together
with d(1) = 1 and d0(1) = 2 (both of which are from property (b)) imply that
1 d(t)  2" 1
2
d00(1)"2 and (1 t)d0(t)  2" d00(1)"2. The former is greater whenever
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d00(1) > 0. Notice that d00(1) = C11(1; 1) + 2C12(1; 1) + C22(1; 1) = 2C12(1; 1) since
Cii(1; 1) = 0 (which is again from property (b)). So d
00(1) > 0 if and only if
C12(1; 1) > 0, which is equivalent to the condition stated in the proposition according
to (28).
The negative dependence result. Since Pr(Xi > ajX i > b) decreases in b for
any a, for any given realization of (Yi; Y i) we have Pr(Xi > a + YijX i > b + Y i)
decreases in b. Then Pr(Zi > ajZ i > b) decreases in b for any a. (This is called
right tail decreasing in Nelson, 2006.) Corollary 5.2.6. in Nelson (2006) then
implies that for any t 2 (0; 1) we have
Ci(t; t) <
t  C(t; t)
1  t
, i = 1; 2.
So (1  t)d0(t) < 2(t  d(t)). Then a su¢cient condition for (27) is
1  d(t)  2(t  d(t)), d(t)  2t  1 :
This is always true given property (d).
The positive dependence result. As in the proof of Proposition 3 in Chen and
Riordan (2013), (27) can be rewritten as
1  2t+ d(t) +
Z 1
t
(1  )C11(; t)d+
Z 1
t
(1  )C22(t; )d > 0 at t = 1 
1
n
: (29)
(This can be veried by using integration by parts and property (b).) Given
Pr(Xi > ajX i > b)  Pr(Xi > a) (which is called positive quadrant depen-
dence in Nelson, 2006), we have F (x1; x2)  F1(x1)F2(x2). This implies that
H(z1; z2)  H1(z1)H2(z2) and so d(t)  t
2 for any t. Also notice that C1(; t) =
H2(H
 1
2 (t)jH
 1
1 ()) = H2(0jH
 1
1 ()) at t = 1  
1
n
. Then our condition on the con-
ditional distribution implies that C11(; t) >  1 for   t = 1  
1
n
. Similarly,
C22(t; ) >  1 for   t = 1 
1
n
. Then the left-hand side of (29) is strictly greater
than (1  t)2   2
R 1
t
(1  )d = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1: For a given consumer, let I(yi), i = 1; 2, be the identity of
the rm where yi is realized. The lower bound of Y (y1; y2) is from the fact that
the lowest possible match utility of the bundle from rm I(yi) is yi + xj. We now
calculate the conditional probability of Y (y1; y2) < y. This event occurs if and
only if all of the following three conditions are satised: (i) y1 + X
I(y1)
2 < y, (ii)
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X
I(y2)
1 + y2 < y, and (iii) X
k
1 + X
k
2 < y for all k 6= I(y1); I(y2) among the n   1
competitors. Given y1 and y2, condition (i) holds with probability
F2(y   y1jy1)
F2(y2jy1)
;
since the cdf of X
I(y1)
2 conditional on y1 and X
I(y1)
2 < y2 is F2(x2jy1)=F2(y2jy1).
Similarly, condition (ii) holds with probability
F1(y   y2jy2)
F1(y1jy2)
:
One can also check (with the help of a graph) that the probability that Xk1 +X
k
2 < y
holds for a rm other than I(y1) and I(y2), is
1
F (y1; y2)
 
F (y1; y   y1) +
Z y2
y y1
Z y x2
x
1
f(x1; x2)dx1dx2
!
:
(The term in the bracket is the unconditional probability that (Xk1 ; X
k
2 ) lies in the
region where Xki < yi and X
k
1 + X
k
2 < y.) Conditional on y1 and y2, these three
events are independent of each other. Therefore, the conditional probability of
Y (y1; y2) < y is as stated in (6).
Proof of Lemma 2: We rst explain how to calculate E[(Y1; Y2;)] dened in
(7), where the expectation is taken over (Y1; Y2;). Using (5) in the i.i.d. case, we
have
E[(Y1; Y2;)] =
1
n  1
Z
(y1; y2; y1+y2)dG
+
n  2
n  1
Z 
L(y1 + y2   jy1; y2)(y1; y2; y1 + y2   ) +
Z y1+y2
y1+y2 
(y1; y2; y)dL(yjy1; y2)

dG ;
where G(y1; y2) = F (y1; y2)
n 1 and L(yjy1; y2) is dened in (6). By integration by
parts and using L(y1 + y2jy1; y2) = 1, we can simplify this to
E[(Y1; Y2;)] =
Z
(y1; y2; y1+y2)dG 
n  2
n  1
Z Z y1+y2
y1+y2 
@
@y
(y1; y2; y)L(yjy1; y2)dy

dG :
Now let us derive the rst-order approximation of . (For our purpose, we do not
need the higher-order approximations.) According to the formula above, we have
 =
Z
f(y1   )(1  F (y2 + ))dG+
n  2
n  1
Z
'(y1; y2; )dG ; (30)
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where
'(y1; y2; ) =
Z y1+y2
y1+y2 
f(y1   )f(y   y1 + )L(yjy1; y2)dy :
When   0, we have f(y1   )  f(y1)  f
0(y1), soZ
f(y1   )dG 
Z
f(y1)dF (y1)
n 1   
Z
f 0(y1)dF (y1)
n 1 = h(0)  h0(0) :
We also have 1  F (y2 + )  1  F (y2)  f(y2), soZ
(1 F (y2+ ))dG 
Z
(1 F (y2))dF (y2)
n 1  
Z
f(y2)dF (y2)
n 1 =
1
n
  h(0) :
To approximate
R
'(y1; y2; )dG, notice that '(y1; y2; 0) = 0 and '3(y1; y2; 0) =
f(y1)f(y2) since L(yjy1; y2) is independent of  and L(y1 + y2jy1; y2) = 1. Hence,Z
'(y1; y2; )dG  
Z
f(y1)f(y2)dG = h(0)
2 :
Substituting these approximations into (30) and discarding all higher order terms
yields the approximation for  in (24). The other approximations can be derived
similarly.
Proof of Proposition 4: We rst show that when n is large, the system of (20)
and (21) has a solution with a small  under mild conditions.
Lemma 3 Suppose jf
0(x)j
f(x)
is uniformly bounded and limn!1 p^ = 0, where p^ =
1
nh(0)
is the separate sales price in (2). Then when n is su¢ciently large, the system of
(20) and (21) has a solution with  2 (0; 1
nh(0)
).
Proof. Recall that (21) is
1=n+ ( + )
 +  + 2
(   ) = 
1()   :
Denote the left-hand side by L() and the right-hand side by R(). Notice that the
assumption that jf
0(x)j
f(x)
is uniformly bounded implies that jh
0(0)j
h(0)
is uniformly bounded
for any n.17
We rst show that L(0) < R(0). At  = 0, it is easy to verify that  =
1
n
h(0),
 =
 
1  1
n

h(0),  = 0 and 
1(0) =
1
n
 
1  1
n

. Then
L(0) =
1
n
(1 
2
n
) < R(0) =
1
n
(1 
1
n
) :
17Suppose
jf 0(x)j
f(x) < M for a constant M < 1. Then  Mf(x) < f
0(x) < Mf(x), and so
 M
R
f(x)dF (x)n 1 <
R
f 0(x)dF (x)n 1 < M
R
f(x)dF (x)n 1 for any n. That is,  Mh(0) <
h0(0) < Mh(0) for any n, and so
jh0(0)j
h(0) is uniformly bounded.
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Next, we show that L() > R() at  =
1
nh(0)
when n is su¢ciently large. The
condition limn!1 p^ = 0 implies that  =
1
nh(0)
 0 when n is large. Replacing  in
(24) by 1
nh(0)
, we have
 
h(0)
n
 

h0(0)
n
+
h(0)2
n  1

1
nh(0)
=
h(0)
n
 
h0(0)
n2h(0)
 
h(0)
n(n  1)
:
Similarly,
 

1 
1
n

h(0) +

h0(0)
n
  h(0)2

1
nh(0)
=

1 
2
n

h(0) +
h0(0)
n2h(0)
;
 
nh(0)2
n  1
1
nh(0)
=
h(0)
n  1
;

1() 
1
n

1 
1
n

 
2h(0)
n
1
nh(0)
=
1
n
 
3
n2
:
Notice that in each expression we just replaced  by 1
nh(0)
and no further approxi-
mations have been made.
Notice that L() > R() if and only if
1
n
+ ( + )

(   ) > [
1()  ] ( +  + 2) : (31)
Using the above approximations, we have
 +  
2h(0)
n
 
h0(0)
n2h(0)
and     

1 
3
n

h(0) +
2h0(0)
n2h(0)
+
h(0)
n(n  1)
:
Then the left-hand side of (31) equals
1
n
+
1
nh(0)

2h(0)
n
 
h0(0)
n2h(0)



1 
3
n

h(0) +
2h0(0)
n2h(0)
+
h(0)
n(n  1)

=

1
n
+
2
n2
 
1
n3
h0(0)
h(0)2



h(0) 
3
n
h(0) +
2h0(0)
n2h(0)
+
h(0)
n(n  1)



1
n
 
1
n2

h(0) :
(The nal step is from discarding all higher order terms. This is valid given limn!1
1
nh(0)
=
0 and jh
0(0)j
h(0)
is uniformly bounded for any n.)
Using the approximations, we also have

1()   
1
n
 
4
n2
+
1
n2(n  1)
+
h0(0)
n3h(0)2
;
and
 +  + 2  h(0) +   h(0) +
h(0)
n  1
=
n
n  1
h(0) ;
30
where we have used the fact that  +  +   h(0) when  is small. Then the
right-hand side of (31) equals
1
n
 
4
n2
+
1
n2(n  1)
+
h0(0)
n3h(0)2


n
n  1
h(0) 

1
n
 
3
n(n  1)

h(0) :
(The nal step is again from discarding all higher order terms.) Then it is ready to
see that L() > R() at  =
1
nh(0)
when n is su¢ciently large. This completes the
proof of the lemma.
Given the system has a solution with a small  when n is large, we can approx-
imate each side of (21) around   0 by using (24) and discarding all higher order
terms. Then one can solve
p 
1
nh(0)
1 + h(0)
1 + n
n 1
h(0)
;  
1
2h0(0)
h(0)
+ 2n
2 3n+2
n2 n
nh(0)
:
It is clear that p < p^ = 1
nh(0)
.
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